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Researchers have typically defined insight as a sudden new idea or understanding 
accompanied by an emotional feeling of Aha. Recently, examples of negative insight in 
everyday creative problem solving have been identified. These are seen as sudden and 
sickening moments of realisation experienced as an Uh-oh rather than Aha. However, such 
experiences have yet to be explored from an experimental perspective. One barrier to doing 
so is that methods to elicit insight in the lab. are constrained to positive insight. This study 
therefore aimed to develop a novel methodology that elicits both positive and negative insight 
solving, and additionally provides the contrasting experiences of analytic search solving in 
the same controlled conditions. The game of Connect 4 was identified as having the potential 
to produce these experiences, with each move representing a solving episode (where best to 
place the counter). Eighty participants played six games of Connect 4 against a computer and 
reported each move as being a product of positive search, positive insight, negative search or 
negative insight. Phenomenological ratings were then collected to provide validation of the 
experiences elicited. The results demonstrated that playing Connect 4 saw reporting of insight 
and search experiences that were both positive and negative, with the majority of participants 
using all four solving types. Phenomenological ratings suggest that these reported 
experiences were comparable to those elicited by existing laboratory methods focused on 
positive insight. This establishes the potential for Connect 4 to be used in future problem 
solving research as a reliable elicitation tool of insight and search experiences for both 
positive and negative solving. Furthermore, Connect 4 may be seen to offer more true to life 
solving experiences than other paradigms where a series of problems are solved working 
towards an overall superordinate goal rather than the presentation of stand-alone and un-
related problems. Future work will need to look to develop versions of Connect 4 with greater 
control in order to fully utilise this methodology for creative problem solving research in 
experimental psychology and neuroscience contexts. 
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1 Introduction  
An insight moment is defined as a sudden new understanding, idea or solution 
accompanied by an emotional Aha experience (Jung-Beeman et al., 2008; Klein & Jarosz, 
2011). Insight has long been recognised as a desirable feature of creative problem solving, 
with many famous examples of discoveries in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics) being attributed to it. Maryam Mirzakhani, winner of the Field’s medal 
demonstrates this when asked about mathematics, “the most rewarding part is the “Aha” 
moment, the excitement of discovery and enjoyment of understanding something new, the 
feeling of being on top of a hill, and having a clear view” (CMI, 2008, p. 12). A similar 
rewarding aspect to insight moments has recently been demonstrated by Friedlander and Fine 
(2016) whose Cryptic Crossword solving sample identified the Penny Dropping Moment (the 
Crossword solver community’s term for insight moments) as the main motivation for 
pursuing their hobby. In both these examples the insight experience is a positive one, 
something that can be seen as a tacit assumption in the historical approach to insight research 
(Gick & Lockhart, 1995). More recently however it has been proposed that insight moments 
might incorporate negative realisations, with an accompanying Uh-oh moment rather than the 
prototypical Aha (Hill & Kemp, 2016 also Hill & Kemp in preparation). This presents a 
problem for current methods that elicit insight for empirical exploration, which are only 
designed to produce positive solving experiences. Therefore the development of new methods 
that stimulate a full range of solving experiences is required to reflect and experimentally test 
these recent developments in the insight and creativity literature. As such this article 
describes a preliminary exploration of a new method to elicit experiences that incorporates 
both positive and negative insight and search solving. 
 
Contemporary research has begun to take a renewed interest in the phenomenology of 
insight with a varying focus on emotional experiences (Danek et al. 2014a; Jarman, 2014). 
Danek et al.’s (2014a) participants attempted to solve the puzzle of how a magician had 
performed different tricks and demonstrated that the resulting solutions arose through both 
insight and search strategies. In a novel step, after they had completed all the trials 
participants reported their experiences whilst solving the tricks through insight using a visual 
analogue scale to rate against various components. The components of these scales were 
identified by the researchers and verified through qualitative, open solving descriptions from 
the participants given before they offered the ratings. Ratings were made for the level of 
impasse participants experienced before their Aha moment; how pleasant, sudden and 
surprising solutions were and; how certain they were of the insight solutions they found.  
Pleasantness was the highest rated feature, with impasse being interpreted as least indicative 
of Aha solutions. However, as recognised by Danek et al. (2014a), no ratings were recorded 
for search solutions meaning it was not clear if the phenomenological features identified were 
unique to insight solving and separable from more general responses to solving problems. 
  
Webb et al. (2016) used the phenomenological rating scales developed by Danek et al. 
(2014a) across a variety of established tasks that elicit insight problem solving experience. 
Rather than use a dichotomous approach to labelling of solving experience (i.e. search or 
insight), their participants rated their feeling of Aha on a visual analogue scale (rating the 
feeling of Aha). They found that pleasantness was positively correlated with feelings of Aha 
and this effect was consistent across the different types of problem presented (classic insight, 
classic non-insight and Compound Remote Associates [CRA]). Other features showed less 
consistency, notably impasse either showed no correlation or a negative correlation. These 
ratings were made on a trial-by-trial basis offering further support for the scales’ validity in 
capturing phenomenological components of insight. As such these studies provide 
converging evidence to support the importance of further exploration of the emotional 
component in insight using phenomenological ratings to do so 
 
Affective aspects of insight have been discussed historically, despite not being 
explored experimentally until recently. Gick and Lockhart (1995) raised the possibility that 
insight experiences may not be universally experienced as pleasant. They identified that some 
solutions might also be accompanied by chagrin, annoyance at the obviousness of the 
revelation they had previously missed. Hill and Kemp (2016) further explored the notion of 
negative aspects of insight in a qualitative study.  They recorded reports of everyday, sudden 
realisations that did not represent the positive Aha experiences attached to solving a problem. 
Instead they demonstrated that negative insights, experienced as Uh-oh moments served to 
identify problems rather than resolve them. A notable example of this is described by 
software entrepreneur and philanthropist Dame Stephanie ‘Steve’ Shirley when outlining the 
coding process. She describes how she often identified mistakes in her computer coding as 
sudden negative insights that occurred early in the morning as she awoke (Al-Khalili, 2015); 
negative insight served to alert her to problems previously unforeseen that she would then 
work to solve. This demonstrates a proposed adaptive function of negative insight (Kemp and 
Hill, in preparation), where identifying a problem has long been seen as an important element 
of problem solving (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, 1995; Guildford, 1951; Runco & Chand, 
1995).  
However, whilst Hill and Kemp’s (2016) research demonstrates experience of negative 
insight in everyday context this was based on qualitative reports which leave a number of 
unanswered questions. There has been little exploration of how components of the insight 
moment that are considered emotional and cognitive are related. Topolinski and Reber (2010) 
asserted that emotional components are epiphenomena, occurring after the purely cognitive 
insight event. In such an account the negative flavour of some insights would result from 
subsequent appraisals, perhaps of disappointment or frustration. However, no experimental 
evidence has to date been provided to directly support this. Furthermore, examination of 
emotion literature highlights different theoretical perspectives that challenge the assumption 
that cognitive events necessarily precede an emotional evaluation. For example, Barrett’s 
(2014) Conceptual Act Theory contends that the separation of mental processes to cognitive 
and emotional is a false dichotomy arguing that both are outcomes of integrated constructed 
experience rather than one being a consequence of the other. It positions valenced core affect 
as central to mental events that are then constructed as cognitive, emotional or perceptual. By 
this account an insight moment would occur with intrinsic positive or negative core affect 
contingent on the insight context (whether the realisation was ‘good for me’ or ‘bad for me’ 
[Gross, 2015]). This study takes a first step to such experimental exploration through the 
development of a task that can provide insight moments that are both positive and negative. 
The types of task typically used to elicit insight were developed against the definition 
of insight which carries the tacit assumption that insight is positive and represents a solving 
experience (for example see Cunningham et al., 2009; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Salvi et al., 
2016; Webb et al., 2016). However, the phenomenological scales developed by Danek et al. 
(2014a) do include the potential to measure negative insight, as they range from very pleasant 
(scored 100) to very unpleasant (scored as 0). Yet in their original study, participants’ 
responses on average ranged in the positive half of the scale (well above 50), demonstrating 
that while the possibility to measure negative experiences is available, current paradigms do 
not elicit this full range of emotional insight responses. Webb et al.’s (2016) positive 
correlation suggests that as problems were solved with greater feeling of insight so were they 
generally rated more positively. However, any exceptions to this association could well be 
hidden by the overall trend. As such current tasks can be seen to offer limited opportunities to 
investigate negative insight moments that potentially occur at earlier stages of the problem 
solving process, for example representing sudden episodes of problem finding rather than 
solution finding. Therefore the full range of insight from negative to positive has yet to be 
fully explored through current experimental paradigms. 
 
Current methods offer the opportunity for isolated and convergent solving 
experiences, with the solving moment signifying the culmination of the trial. For complex 
real-life problems, solving rarely happens in a single insight or search episode. Fleck and 
Weisberg (2004; Weisberg, 2013) proposed a model of problem solving to explain a 
continuum from insight to analysis when finding a solution. Within the stages of this model 
examples of mini-solving episodes can be seen that move the solver closer to their overall 
superordinate goal and may offer a model that better maps to real-life solving. In fact the 
subordinate, mini-solving episodes in this model might be considered as a series of problem 
solving events leading to an ultimate overall goal. In this context, the potential for negative 
insight moments can be identified, when a solving attempt fails but new information arises 
suddenly as a result of the failure. These Uh-oh moments initiate new problem solving 
efforts, perhaps in a different direction that may move the individual closer to their overall 
goal.  
 
This illustrates that different levels of focus can be applied when considering problem 
solving, a point made by Perkins (2000) who identified a structure to break-through ideas 
common across different scales of problem solving. He outlined examples widening in scale 
from an individual’s idea in the moment (more everyday insight) to ‘great’ profound 
realisations resulting from a life’s work; for example Darwin’s development of the theory of 
evolution. In the extreme Perkins (2000) even proposed consideration of problem solving on 
an evolutionary timescale. Such an approach again highlights a disparity between the types of 
tasks currently used to explore insight problem solving in the lab. and more naturalistic, real-
life solving experience. Many current methods present discrete solving episodes that are 
unconnected to each other, whilst solving in everyday life often sees related solving episodes 
moving towards an overall goal.  
 
Table top games can be seen to mimic this, with a series of moves or turns working 
towards the overall goal of winning the game. Chess has been used by cognitive 
psychologists to explore problem solving and decision making and incorporates positive and 
negative experiences as a player builds a winning position and identifies potential negative 
threats from their opponent (Charness, 1992; Chase & Simon, 1975; Gobet & Simon, 1996; 
Leone et al., 2017). However the need to learn the rules of chess and differing levels of player 
ability could introduce potential confounds when being used to explore problem solving 
behaviour. A similarly dyadic game to chess, but with even simpler rules is Connect 4. 
Players take turns to drop counters (each player has separate coloured counters) into a vertical 
grid, the standard version being seven positions wide and six counters deep. The counter falls 
to the lowest position, so the first to be dropped into a column will occupy the lowest row 
with subsequent counters sitting on top of each other. The winner of the game is the first to 
get four adjacent counters in a line; this can be horizontally, vertically or diagonally. In 
playing the game both search and non-search intuitive strategies (potentially insight) can be 
employed to select moves (Mańdziuk, 2012). These moves like chess may be positively 
focused towards building a winning position or responding to a negative realisation aimed at 
preventing an immediate loss. As such, Connect 4 would seem to be a candidate platform to 
elicit repeated episodes of positive and negative solving (selecting the best move) in the 
controlled environment of game play. These solutions being arrived at through analytic 
means or in an experience of insight congruent to those reported in other insight research (for 
example Danek et al., 2014; Bowden & Jung-Beeman et al. 2003a)  
 
Furthermore, Connect 4 with a maximum of 21 moves leading to a full grid and 
stalemate means that a game takes a much shorter time to play than for chess. Yet it retains 
the desirable features highlighted by researchers in problem solving and decision making of 
chess including turn-taking and competition leading to goal-oriented positive moves 
(solutions) and negative problem finding experiences. This would enable multiple, repeated 
solving experiences to be recorded within a relatively short participation period. Tasks that 
produce multiple within-participant comparisons over many trials are important, particularly 
for experimental approaches that incorporate physiological and neuroimaging data in the 
study of problem solving (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b; Hill & Kemp, in preparation; 
Shen and Yuan, 2016). Despite this potential, little research has focused on Connect 4. The 
few papers that do are from the field of Applied Computing exploring algorithms to compute 
the best moves to win (e.g. Allis, 1988) or to develop a learning-based computer system to 
play Connect 4 (Mańdziuk, 2012). Therefore, this study in addition to developing a novel 
methodology to elicit both positive and negative problem solving experiences further aims to 
explore the potential for development of computer-based Connect 4 paradigms for uses 
beyond Applied Computing contexts. 
 
The first aspect necessary in developing this novel problem solving task will be to 
check that the experiences elicited in participants carrying out the task are those identified as 
relevant to the research question of interest. So in this case it will be necessary to demonstrate 
that a full range of solving experiences: positive and negative episodes of both insight and 
search are consistently reported across a range of participants and trials. As seen in the 
development of other problem solving paradigms (for example the CRA or magic tricks) 
participants are given definitions for experiences they are then asked to report having 
completed the task/problem (for example Danek et al., 2016; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). A 
widely adopted definition given to help participants identify [positive] insight is that of Jung-
Beeman et al. (2004); 
A feeling of insight is a kind of ‘Aha!’ characterized by suddenness and 
obviousness. You may not be sure how you came up with the answer but are 
relatively confident that it is correct without having to mentally check it. It is as 
though the answer came into mind all at once-when you first thought of the word, 
you simply knew it was the answer. The feeling does not have to be 
overwhelming, but should resemble what was just described. 
 
More recently an adapted version of this definition incorporated explicit description the 
alternative to insight describing analytic search as stepwise experiences, furthermore using 
the analogy of sudden lightbulb switching on for insight compared to gradual dimming up for 
search (Danek et al., 2016; Danek and Wiley, 2017; Webb et al., 2016). Yet, these studies 
only focus on insight as a positive experience, so a definition for this study will need to 
differentiate between Aha and Uh-oh experiences. However, further extending the already 
quite wordy definitions of insight may be problematic. Emerging evidence from qualitative 
work by Hill and Kemp (in preparation) suggests that participants do not always pay attention 
to all aspects of the research definition of insight given. Qualitative responses were provided 
by participants some of which reported Uh-oh experiences that were responses to a 
surprising, negative external event. They appeared to ignore the given definition requiring 
their Uh-oh moment to be in relation to a new idea or understanding that is central to an 
insight moment. Furthermore, recent research has suggested that the Aha experience can be 
deconstructed into different dimensions and is separable from other aspects of insight solving 
such as solution generation (Danek and Wiley, 2017; Kizilirmak et al., 2016). For the purpose 
of verifying that Connect 4 elicits positive and negative experiences of insight and search 
solving the focus for this study is clearly on the experiential aspects of solving. Therefore the 
development of concise definitions should look to minimise the inclusion of material that 
may be distracting or less relevant and focus on the experiential components of insight and 
search solving. 
 
Danek and Wiley (2017) identified three key aspects important in the experience of 
insight; pleasure, certainty and suddenness. In addition they were able to demonstrate that 
elevated surprise ratings associated with false insight, when the participant experienced an 
insightful solution that was incorrect. In contrast the experience of relief was indicative of 
insight solutions that were correct. In Connect 4 however, each move whilst representing a 
solving episode, does not have a binary correct/ incorrect outcome. As such surprise and 
relief might be less useful in delineating solving experience in this context. Likewise, a 
feeling of certainty may also be problematic, as there is not such a concrete outcome to judge 
the efficacy of a move compared to the binary question of how certain someone is that their 
proposed solution (for example identified word in the CRA) is correct. Therefore a focus on 
the remaining aspects of suddenness and pleasure (termed more broadly as emotional valence 
to incorporate negative experience) will be used to develop working definitions for this 
paradigm. 
 This study therefore reports the implementation of a new domain of Connect 4 in 
problem solving research with the aim of eliciting positive and negative, insight and search 
experiences reliably in participants. It will further explore the validity of this method by using 
established scales (feelings of insight and phenomenological ratings) used in research 
paradigms that focus on positive insight and search solving to measure this experience. In 
addition, a behavioural measure (move time) will also be compared, as this has been shown 
to be a distinctive aspect in previous research; with insight moves being faster than search 
(Danek et al., 2014b; Kounios et al 2008; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Shen et al. 2015). As 
such a series of hypotheses are proposed to meet these aims. Firstly, there will be a difference 
in speed of moves reported for different types of solving, specifically insight moves will be 
faster than search. Moves labelled as positive insight and positive search will be rated as 
more pleasant than negative insight and search ones. Insight moves will be rated as more 
surprising and sudden than search. Finally, there will be no influence of solving type or 
valence on ratings of move certainty. 
2 Methods  
2.1 Participants 
Eighty participants (54 female) were recruited via advertisement within the University 
and local community. Participants were all over 18 years old (Mage = 30.63 years, SDage = 
12.64, range age 18-66 years), with a mixture of native English speakers and those with 
English as an additional language (n = 10). Some participants were repeat participants in a 
longitudinal study that compared solving performance across different tasks (reported 
elsewhere). In addition to the data reported here, additional physiological (heart rate and 
interoceptive heart beat counting task) and psychological measures (emotionality self-reports) 
were recorded (also reported elsewhere). 
 
2.2 Materials 
A commercially developed, computer-based version of Connect 4 was used (Connect 
Four Fun developed by TMSoft, tmsoft.com, copyright 2008-2016). The game has single and 
two player options, the former being used in this study. The ‘night’ theme was selected and 
used for all participants due to its relatively neutral background. In the multigame setting, the 
player who starts (human player or computer) is determined by the winner of the previous 
game which could potentially introduce confounds, therefore a single game setting was used 
meaning the human player [participant] always made the first move. The level of difficulty 
could be selected on a game by game basis choosing from: easy, medium, hard, pro and 
expert. These represented subjective labels for the difficulty of play determined by the 
algorithms of the game (not available to the researcher). This was not deemed to be 
problematic as participants were self-identifying the level to play. See below in Discussion 
for further evaluation of this. 
 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Feeling of insight. Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) developed a forced choice response of 
either insight or non-insight. Participants made these self-reports after each problem solving 
episode (in the original study’s case after each CRA puzzle was solved). This study adapted 
the self-report measure to additionally incorporate valance, creating four solving experiences 
as shown in table 1. Valence was differentiated in terms of motivations for the move, positive 
moves focused towards winning and negative moves avoiding losing. To distinguish between 
insight and search, the emotional descriptors of Aha and Uh-oh were used for insight along 
with the key idea that these occur suddenly. In contrast, search descriptions focused on 
gradually working out a move. The descriptions used were consistent with previous 
descriptions used to explore insight (see Hill & Kemp, 2016). ). A further option was 
included in line with Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007) who enabled participants to choose 
‘other’ to ensure that participants were not forced to choose an experience that was not 
congruent to them. This option was labelled as neutral / or no reason. 
 
Table 1 Self-reported feeling of insight: Descriptions given to participants playing 
Connect 4. 




You suddenly have an idea for your 





You work out your next move or how 
to win 
 




You suddenly see a problem or that 





You work out a problem or that you 
are in danger of losing 
I've worked out 
there's a problem 
 
2.3.2 Phenomenological Self-Report Scales. Danek et al.’s (2014) phenomenological self-
report scales were used to measure self-reported ratings of pleasantness, surprise, suddenness 
and certainty of the different solution types. As detailed above this measure has been further 
validated in relation to an established range of insight problems by Webb et al. (2016). 
Impasse was not measured as participants were unlikely to experience this in the context of 
Connect 4 (as they would always be able to make a move and not looking for a single correct 
answer). Following the methodology of Danek et al. (2014) these were presented at the end 
of the study after all games of Connect 4 had been played. Each visual analogue scale (VAS) 
for phenomenological rating was presented one screen at a time in PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007; 
2008) using the default VAS settings that presented the rating line in the centre of the screen 
with labels for either end of the scale (see Table 2 for the labels for each rating scale) and 
prompt question above. The position marked on the line by the participant provided a score 
between 1 and 0. Ratings were presented in a random order in terms of both the different 
types of solving and rating being given. This method minimized the chance that participants 
were simply responding in relation to the definitions given (although does not exclude this 
possibility – see further in Discussion). First, as the reports were presented separately and 
randomized, participants’ attention was directed to the two specific aspects of each rating 
being requested (the solving type and phenomenological aspect being rated) reducing the 
likelihood of comparisons between ratings for different solving types. Second, as no numbers 
were used in the reports participants gave, simply a position on a line this again made it 
harder for participants to make reports relative to their previous ratings given. 
Table 2 Questions asked of participants providing phenomenological ratings for the 
different solving types and labels for visual analogue scale. 
Phenomenological 
rating 
Question Label for extremes of VAS 
0                     1 
Pleasantness 

















I felt about the ideas I had through 
positive search: 
uncertain certain 
 Note: italic terms changed according to type of problem participants were rating: positive insight, positive search, negative 
insight or negative search. 
 
2.4 Procedure 
As highlighted in section 2.1 additional data (questionnaires and heart beat counting task) 
was collected  before playing Connect 4, and a second heart beat counting measure was taken 
directly after playing and before completing the phenomenological ratings, these are reported 
elsewhere. The game of Connect 4 was introduced to participants both verbally and with 
written instructions immediately prior to playing. It was described as a game played in pairs 
who take turns in dropping counters in a grid with the winner being the first to get four in a 
row. An illustration of a Connect 4 grid with a winning game was provided and the different 
ways to win (horizontal, vertical and diagonal [shown on picture] lines of four) were 
explained by the researcher. In addition the levels of difficulty that the game could be played 
at were outlined. Descriptions were then provided for the different types of solving 
experience in the context of playing Connect 4 (Table 1).  
 
Participants played a practice game set to the ‘easy’ level before selecting the difficulty 
level they wished to play their first block of three games. Participants indicated when they 
had chosen their move by pressing a button on a watch (Heart Rate monitor watch) recording 
the time of their move decision. Participants then verbally identified their selected move 
(each column was labelled with a number from one to seven) and their feeling of insight 
when making the move. They could indicate the four solving experiences identified in Table 
1 or select a neutral/ no reason option. Reminders of these were provided whilst they were 
playing the game. The researcher recorded the experience for each move before making the 
move indicated, this was to avoid participants having to switch between pressing buttons on 
the watch and operate the Connect 4 game via the mouse or keyboard. Whilst playing the 
cursor was visible on the screen, therefore the researcher left the cursor in the position of the 
last move made (i.e. over the column of the last move) to avoid cuing the participant in any 
way. The participant was positioned facing the screen with the reminder sheet in front of 
them. They were seated next to the researcher, so no unintentional cues such as eye 
movement could be detected by the participant whilst playing the game. After three games 
the participant had the opportunity to stay of the same level of difficulty or to change. The 
last three games were then played following the same protocols. The outcome of each of the 
six games (win, lose or draw) was recorded by the researcher. 
 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 
As this study includes predictions for null hypotheses, for example in relation to 
certainty ratings, a Bayesian approach was taken to analysis as this enables direct testing of 
the fit of the data to the null (H0) compared to alternative hypothesis (H1) (Jarosz & Wiley, 
2014). Therefore Bayesian Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (Bayes RM-ANOVAs) 
were conducted using JASP (JASP Team, 2017) to analyse main effects and interactions for 
solving type [independent grouping variable of insight versus search] and valence 
[independent grouping variable of positive versus negative] on the dependent variables of 
solution time and phenomenological ratings [pleasantness, surprise, certainty and 
suddenness]. As little previous research is available on which to produce informed priors, 
default priors were used with the null hypothesis assumed to have an effect size of zero while 
the alternative an effect size that was not zero (Rouder et al., 2009). Bayes factors are ratios 
that express the likelihood of alternative comparative to null hypothesis (or vice versa), they 
can be reported in terms of the evidence towards the alternative (BF10) or towards the null 
(BF01). Bayes factors of 1-3 represent weak or anecdotal evidence, between 3-10 as moderate, 
10-30 as strong and above 30 as very strong evidence towards the hypothesis indicated (i.e. 
BF10 or BF01) (Jeffreys, 1961; but for slightly different interpretation see Raftery, 1995). 
These interpretations have been adopted by researchers taking a Bayes approach within the 
field of experimental problem solving and insight (for overview of Bayesian approaches in 
the context of problem solving research see Jarosz and Wiley, 2014 and for an example of 
application of this analytical approach see Webb et al., 2016). 
 
2.6 Ethics 
This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations from the 
University Science and Medicine Ethics Committee. All participants gave written informed 
consent in line with the guidelines from the British Psychological Society and in line with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
3 Results 
Participants on average won 3.1 (SD = 1.46) of the six Connect 4 games they played. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of number of games won that approximates to being normally 
distributed. 
 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of participant's wins in Connect 4 
3.1 Connect 4 frequency of solving types 
Of all moves made, 74% were active solving experiences (search or insight rather than moves 
identified as neutral / no reason). 22% of these moves were insight (11% positive and 11% 
negative) and 78% were search (62% positive and 16%). Table 3 shows the range of solving 
types reported by participants whilst playing Connect 4. Just under two thirds allocated 
moves to all four solving types (positive insight, positive search, negative insight and 
negative search) whilst over 90% experienced at least three.  
 
Table 3 Breakdown of participants' reported solving as positive insight (+i), positive 
search (+s), negative insight (-i) and negative search (-s). 
Reported Nos. of participants +i +s -i -s 
4 solving types 54      
3 solving types 19 6     
  1     
  5     
  7     
2 solving types 6 2     
  2     
  2     
1 solving type 1      
 One question of specific interest might be whether all negative insights were reported as a 
direct response to losing or an imminent loss of a game. Comparing negative insight 
reporting across all games played showed that roughly equal reporting of negative insight 
was seen for games that were subsequently won or drawn (41%) compared to lost (59%). 
Furthermore, only 14% of the total negative insight moves were for the last move in a game 
that was lost. 
 
3.2  Move times across different types of solving 
For nine participants timing data recorded on the watch was not available due to a recording 
fault with the equipment they were therefore excluded from analysis exploring move times. 
The overall mean time for a move across the remaining participants was 11.6s (SD = 4.4s). A 
repeated measures Bayesian ANOVA was conducted for participants who reported all four 
solving types (N = 45). Bayes factors (BF) were below 3 for all main effects of solving type 
(IV) and valence (IV) on move time (DV) and when comparing a null model incorporating 
the main effects to the interaction. As such this presents weak evidence of effects of solution 
type or valence of moves on the time taken to make them. 
 
3.3 Phenomenological self-reports 
For pleasantness ratings a repeated measures Bayesian ANOVA (IVs: Solving type 
and valence. DV: pleasantness) provided strong evidence of a main effect of valence (BF10 = 
5.77e+38) and moderate evidence of no main effect of solving type (BF01 = 6.88). Positive 
moves were rated as more pleasant than negative for both types of solving. On viewing the 
graph (Figure 2) presenting these findings it might appear that there was in interaction effect 
of solving type and valence, with insight moves rated as more positive and more negative 
than search. However by adding the main effects to a null model and comparing to one with 
interaction effects there was seen to be weak evidence towards either model (BF = 2.35). 
 
There was strong evidence (BF10 = 266.70) for a main effect of solving (IV) on 
surprise ratings (DV), with insight solutions being rated as more surprising than search for 
both positive and negative moves. There was moderate evidence of no main effect of valence 
(IV: BF01 = 3.36) or interaction effects (BF = 3.71 towards a null model including main 
effects compared to interaction effects) on surprise ratings.  
 
For suddenness (DV) there was strong evidence (BF10 = 527.77) for a main effect of solving 
(IV), with insight solutions reported as more sudden than search. There was moderate 
evidence towards a null effect of valence (IV: BF01 = 5.67) and towards no interaction effects 
(BF = 3.57 towards the null model incorporating main effects).  
 
For certainty ratings (DV) weak evidence was provided for all comparisons (main effects of 
IVs solving and valence, and interaction of the two: all BF’s < 2), meaning no conclusions 
could be made regarding evidence towards the null or alternative hypothesis. Graphs with 
ratings for the four solving types for each phenomenological scale are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Mean phenomenological ratings for solving type (insight / search) and valence 
(positive / negative) for Pleasantness, Surprise, Certainty and Suddenness. Error bars = 
SE 
4 Discussion  
This study demonstrates that Connect 4 represents a naturalistic task that elicits 
insight and search problem solving experiences as a player make moves dropping counters 
into a grid, working towards the overall winning goal of getting four counters in a row. 
Importantly, it has demonstrated for the first time the elicitation of negative insight in a 
laboratory setting, meaning that validation of negative insight from an experimental 
perspective can be undertaken to compliment current research taking a qualitative approach 
(Hill & Kemp, 2016; in preparation). The full range of solving was experienced in the 
majority of participants, with over 90% experiencing at least three of the four solving types. 
As such the utility of Connect 4 to render multiple incidences of within participant 
comparisons of different solving is apparent that is particularly important for experimental 
approaches and those that incorporate neuroimaging and physiological approaches (Bowden 
& Jung-Beeman, 2003b; Hill & Kemp, in preparation; Shen & Yuan, 2016). Varying 
proportions of insight to search are seen for different types of elicitation task. For CRA 
problems around half of solved trials lead to insight reports (e.g. Cranford and Moss, 2010; 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).  Magic tricks conversely gave a higher proportion of non-insight 
trials, ranging from 41% reported as insight by Danek et al., (2014) to 29% by Hedne, 
Norman and Metcalfe’s (2016). It can therefore be seen that different methods elicit insight 
and search solutions to different degrees. Connect 4 in this study showed a lower rate of 
insight solving than other methods. However whilst magic tricks and CRA paradigms 
provided solving experiences in under 60% of the trials ,74% of moves in Connect 4 provided 
reported solving experience. 
 
 Participants’ post-game phenomenological reports verified hypothesised 
characteristics of the experiences elicited whilst playing Connect 4 in line with previous 
research (Danek, 2014a, Webb et al., 2016), finding that positive search and insight were 
rated as more pleasant than negative search and insight. Furthermore showing that insight 
(both negative and positive) moves were experienced as more surprising and sudden. Finally, 
there was not sufficient evidence to support the alternative or null hypothesis exploring 
certainty ratings across solving and valence. As such this demonstrates that Connect 4 serves 
as a useful potential method to explore aspects experimentally across the full range of 
positive and negative insight and search solving as it performs in line with a range other 
insight elicitation methods that are limited to eliciting positive solving experiences. 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, Danek et al. (2014a) identified a limitation relating 
to their phenomenological ratings as participants did not provide ratings for non-insight, 
search solutions against which to compare. Subsequent papers however have tended to adopt 
the feeling of Aha or insight measured reported on a visual analogue scale (e.g. Webb et al.,  
2016) again meaning comparisons between phenomenological aspects of solving experienced 
as insight or search was not conducted. This paper therefore offers additional support, 
directly testing the predictions seen in previous literature relating to aspects of pleasantness, 
suddenness, surprise and certainty attached to insight compared to search solving. 
 
In terms of pleasantness, as hypothesised in this study positive insight and search 
solving were rated as more pleasant than negative solving. However, in previous literature it 
is suggested that positive emotions of happiness or pleasure were particularly associated with 
insight moments (Danek et al. 2014a, Shen et al., 2015). Danek et al.’s (2014a) participants, 
before providing the phenomenological ratings for their insight solutions also gave free 
reports describing their insight experiences. One of the resulting themes from this related 
specifically to emotional happiness, this was by far the most reported aspect relating to the 
insight experience. Shen et al., 2015 showed a direct comparison of happiness ratings (using 
different rating scales from Danek et al.’s [2014a]) for CRA insight and search solutions, 
showing that insight trials were rated higher for happiness than search. As such it might be 
predicted that positive insight would be rated as more pleasant than positive search. As little 
previous research has considered negative insight it is less easy to make predictions in 
relation to this. As shown in Figure 2a, there is a pattern that suggests that positive insight 
might be seen as more pleasant than positive search, and negative insight be seen as more 
unpleasant then negative search solving. However, as highlighted by the accompanying 
Bayesian analysis, no definitive conclusion for or against this pattern can be reached from the 
current data. This is therefore something to further explore in future research. 
 
In addition to insight being more pleasant, insight solutions are also proposed to be 
more sudden. Connect 4 moves labelled as insight were rated as being more sudden than 
search for both positive and negative solving. Danek et al. (2014a) found suddenness to be 
less important in insight ratings than factors of pleasantness, surprise and certainty, but as 
previously mentioned did not directly compare ratings to those non-insight ratings. Shen et al. 
(2015) did not have a measure of suddenness but found that participants rated greater 
hesitation for search trials than insight, so greater hesitation would map to reduced feelings of 
suddenness, making this finding congruent to the current results. Corroborating behavioural 
findings to these perceived ratings can be seen from many early CRA studies that show faster 
responding for trials labelled as insight than search (e.g. Danek et al., 2014b; Kounios et al 
2008; Subramaniam et al., 2008; Shen et al. 2015 but also see critique of this by Cranford and 
Moss, 2010, 2011, 2012). One caution to this finding echoes that identified by Danek et al. 
(2014a) that suddenness formed a key part of the definition given to participants, so their 
ratings may simply reflect this rather than their experience of insight and search. Indeed, 
contrary to these self-reports there was insufficient evidence from behavioural measures of 
Connect 4 move speed (but see limitations below for further evaluation of this measure). 
Furthermore, Webb et al. (2016) highlighted that it is unclear if suddenness is an aspect of 
insight that generalises across problem types. Results here would again suggest further work 
be necessary to be confident regarding this aspect in relation to insight compared to search in 
Connect 4 solving. 
 
Previous research in the role of surprise in insight is even less clear. For example, 
Danek et al. (2014a) and Shen et al. (2015) found conflicting results in respect of surprise, 
with Shen et al. (2015) not finding that it featured in free responses participants gave in an 
exploratory study, whilst Danek et al. (2014a) found it was the second most important 
emotion after happiness. Likewise, Webb et al. (2016) demonstrated that feelings of Aha 
were more related to surprise than accuracy of the solution. This study again demonstrated 
congruent results, that insight solving was rated as more surprising than search for both 
positive and negative solving. Danek and Wiley (2017) suggested that surprise could further 
distinguish between true and false insight (where solutions were correct or incorrect), with 
higher surprise ratings for false insight. However, as identified in Connect 4, each move does 
not result in a dichotomous outcome that is either correct or incorrect, meaning such a 
relationship would be harder to quantify using the Connect 4 paradigm. 
 
The absence of clear right/wrong outcomes for Connect 4 moves was again reflected 
in the lack of support from the data in effects for certainty ratings. Future work using the 
Connect 4 paradigm might consider introducing an objective measure of quality of moves 
that could be seen as comparable to correct/incorrect in other paradigms (e.g. Danek and 
Wiley, 2017). In the current study an overall marker of quality might be suggested in 
examining the number of games won. However, participants were able to self-select the level 
of difficulty they played at, meaning that the overall win rates of players were not 
comparable. Asking participants to play at set levels of difficulty would not make sense in 
terms of the aims of the study which was to elicit within participant solving experiences; if a 
level was too difficult or easy this would limit the solving that could take place. Figure 1 
demonstrates that participants were indeed selecting a level of play of appropriate challenge, 
as the approximate normal distribution of winning games with no ceiling or floor effects 
suggests participants were not playing at a level that was too easy or difficult. Furthermore, it 
is the within participant efficacy of each move relating to phenomenological experience that 
is of interest and therefore future research should look to develop such a measure of quality 
of moves similar to that seen in chess research (Sigman et al., 2010). However, such a 
measure would require firstly all the moves made to be recorded and compared to the options 
on the grid at each play point, something that was not possible using the commercial version 
of Connect 4 employed in this study. 
 
This highlights a current limitation of this paradigm which is the need for a better, 
more fit for purpose version of Connect 4 to be developed. In addition to not being able to 
measure and quantify move quality the commercial version used ran a game without breaks 
in play. This meant that data collected whilst playing had to be done verbally requiring the 
presence of a researcher. Furthermore, the move time data relied on button presses on a watch 
which incorporated participants’ responses to the type of solving, meaning the accuracy of 
these is questionable. This potentially introduced confounds (although precautions were taken 
to minimise the experimenter effects – see Method) and for the future complete automation of 
the task would be desirable. For example, this study took the approach introduced by Danek 
et al. (2014) of obtaining phenomenological ratings post task. More recent work has obtained 
these ratings for each trial of solving (see Danek & Wiley, 2017; Webb et al., 2016) which is 
preferable as it means the ratings are made close to the actual solving experience, minimising 
memory effects and likely confounding influences of definitions on ratings obtained. In order 
to do so with the current Connect 4 version would require interrupting each move in the game 
and switching to a different software or computer to collect this data; having a bespoke 
Connect 4 version would enable such data collection features to be incorporated. 
Furthermore, heart rate data collection (reported elsewhere) that took place whilst participants 
played Connect 4 was compromised. There were not long enough breaks between moves to 
adequately ascribe heart rate effects to individual solving experiences, again adding adequate 
time breaks between moves is something that could be built in to a bespoke Connect 4 
version. 
 
It could be questioned if the negative insights reported in this study are true instances 
of negative insight or the result of negative appraisals due to losing a game. As reported in 
section 3.1 negative insight was not only reported as a result of losing a game, with a small 
amount of the overall reported negative insight moves being the final move in a lost game. In 
fact just under half the reported negative insight moves were in winning games. This would 
support that participants were reporting moves reflective of their experience of problem 
solving rather than in response to the outcome of a game (i.e. winning or losing). 
 
A further matter for discussion is whether the methods used in this study (and 
previous work in the field) simply represent circularity in relation to definitions given to 
participants producing corresponding phenomenological reports. However, the authors 
believe that several factors mitigate these concerns. Firstly, participants were not forced to 
choose one of the four solving types, but had the additional option of neutral / no reason. This 
means that if the solving descriptions given did not match participants’ experience they could 
indicate as such. Whilst some participants selected the no reason / neutral option for some 
moves, particularly early in the game (verbally for example many suggested that they always 
took the same first move) none exclusively selected it. This suggests the solving descriptions 
did map to genuine experience rather than representing a demand characteristic of a forced 
choice. Specifically addressing the possibility of phenomenological ratings representing 
demand characteristics reflecting definitions given. Firstly steps were taken to reduce this 
possibility (see section 2.3.2) in terms of limiting the comparisons participants could make in 
the ratings they provided. Furthermore, whilst definitions given did explicitly include 
descriptions of suddenness, they did not describe things in terms of pleasantness, surprise or 
certainty. Future research could further look to reduce the possibility of circularity in a 
number of ways. As highlighted above, a more advanced version of Connect 4 that enabled 
phenomenological ratings to be taken for each move made (at the time of the move rather 
than at the end of the study) should improve the quality of these reports. As discussed 
recently by Laukkonen and Tangen (2018) self-reports made as close to the solving 
experience as possible reduce the influence of confounds such those from memory reflecting 
earlier descriptions of experience given. In addition, the effect of giving definitions on 
subsequent phenomenological reports in problem solving paradigms could further be 
explored. 
 
In summary, this study represents a proof of concept for the utility of Connect 4 as a 
paradigm to elicit problem solving experiences across valence (positive to negative) and 
solving type (insight to search). This should enable further experimental investigation of 
problem solving that incorporates the recently described negative insight, contrasting this to 
positive insight and search-based solving. Future work is required to develop better computer 
hosted versions of the game that would enable the incorporation of bespoke features for 
research designs to: minimise confounding effects such as the presence of an experimenter; 
enable synchronisation with other equipment, for example fMRI or physiological recording 
and; enable within task data collection for instance as discussed above, phenomenological 
ratings for each move [trial]. 
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